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Poverty in Mexico’s Southern States 
 
Quentin Wodon, Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, and Corinne Siaens 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This Note attempts to answer the following questions: How poor are the southern states of 
Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca? How much progress was achieved in the 1990s toward 
reducing poverty in these states? Why are households in these states so poor? Specifically, does 
their poverty result from a lack of assets or from low returns to existing assets? Finally, to what 
extent do federal transfers and programs benefit the south and poor households within the 
south?  
The main results and conclusions that emerge from the analysis are as follows: 
· How poor is the south? Households living in the southern states are very poor, and 
certainly much poorer than households living in the rest of Mexico. Estimates of income 
and consumption poverty suggest that two thirds of the population in the southern 
states may not be able to pay for the cost of their basic food and nonfood needs, versus 
42 to 45 percent of the population at the national level (Table 1). While these estimates of 
poverty are probably on the high side, the differences between the south and the 
country as a whole would be even more striking if methodologies yielding smaller 
estimates were used. The high level of deprivation in the south is confirmed by both the 
Marginality Index (based on access to basic infrastructure services, housing conditions, 
education attainment, and wage earnings) from the National Population Council 
(Consejo Nacional de Población—CONAPO) and the Human Development Index (HDI) 
(based on per capita gross domestic product [GDP], educational achievement and 
enrollment, and life expectancy) from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP).. For both indices, the three southern states have the lowest rankings among all 
states. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics on Indicators of Well-Being in the Southern States, 2000 
  National Chiapas Guerrero Oaxaca 
Share of population in poverty  
 
42%–45% 
 
Three states jointly: 67%–68% 
 
Share of population in extreme poverty  
 
23%–25% 
 
Three states jointly: 54%–56% 
 
Human Development Index and state ranking 
 
0.791 
 
0.693  
(32nd) 
0.719  
(30th) 
0.706  
(31st) 
CONAPO Marginality Index and state ranking 
 
— 
 
2.25  
(1st) 
2.12  
(2nd) 
2.08  
(3rd) 
—Not applicable 
Source: Authors’ estimation for poverty; CONAPO for marginality and HDI. 
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· How much progress has been achieved toward poverty reduction? Some progress was 
achieved in the 1990s (Figure 1). Although the pace of progress for income and 
consumption poverty could have been faster, with better growth in rural areas and no 
increase in inequality, the gains achieved are real. In other areas as well (such as primary 
school enrollment and access to basic infrastructure services), the pace of progress is 
encouraging. Thus, the south may be slowly catching up, especially in nonmonetary 
areas of well-being, even though there may not be income or GDP convergence yet. 
 
Figure 1. Trend in Extreme Poverty According to Consumption 
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       Source: Author’s estimate 
 
 
· Why are households in the southern states so poor? Households in the south have a 
level of per capita income that is only half (54 percent) that enjoyed at the national level. 
An analysis of the determinants of income poverty suggests two main reasons for this. 
First, two thirds of the differences in per capita income are the result of differences in 
assets rather than differences in the returns to these assets. This implies that a poverty-
reduction strategy for the south must rely primarily on interventions designed to 
improve the assets of the households living there. Second, as shown in Figure 2, in terms 
of categories of assets explaining the differences in income between the south and 
Mexico as a whole, the quality of employment comes first (accounting for 43 percent of 
the gap), followed by education (32 percent of the gap). Living in urban areas and 
unobserved effects likely to result from differences in area characteristics between the 
south and the country as a whole come third, at 17 percent. The contribution of 
demographic and labor force participation characteristics is lower, at only 8 percent. 
While the analysis may be sensitive to some assumptions for the measurement of 
differences in per capita income and their determinants, it does suggest where gains can 
be obtained to improve standards of living. (As pointed out by government counterparts 
in Guerrero, the comparatively lower quality of the jobs in the south relates to broader 
issues of the lack of public and private investments and the relatively high cost of doing 
business in the south; these issues are discussed in more detail in some of the other 
Notes in this report.) 
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Figure 2. Factors Explaining Difference in Income 
between the South and the Country as a Whole
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Source: Authors’ estimate 
 
 
· To what extend do federal programs and transfers reach the south and the poor who 
live there? Almost all countries in Latin America experienced an increase in public 
social spending in the 1990s. In Mexico, the increase was 55 percent, thanks to economic 
growth (a higher level of per capita gross national product [GNP] leads to higher 
spending per capita, holding the share of spending in GNP constant), a higher level of 
fiscal pressure, and a reorientation of fiscal priorities toward the social sectors. We have 
not estimated the extent to which the southern states have benefited from this increase 
in spending. But several categories of spending are explicitly targeted to poor areas and 
households, and therefore to the south. A state-level analysis suggests that poorer states 
tend to benefit more than other states from spending for social funds and a range of 
targeted programs. In Figure 3, the redistributive impact of federal transfers is measured 
through the Gini income elasticity (GIE) of the various transfers (see text for more 
explanation). A value of zero for the GIE implies that all states receive transfers in 
proportion to their population. A value below zero indicates more spending for the 
poorer states. A value higher than zero indicates more spending for the richer states. 
Clearly, poorer states (including the three southern states) benefit well from a number of 
federal programs. At the household level, while food subsidies do not appear to be well 
targeted in the south, demand-side education and human development programs such 
as the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (Programa de Educación, Salud y 
Alimentación—PROGRESA) and others appear to be well targeted. Some of these 
programs also have features that generate long-term gains for beneficiaries, beyond the 
immediate cash transfers provided (for a discussion of long-term gains from programs, 
see the Millennium Development Goals Note and the efficiency of the southern states in 
reaching these goals). 
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Figure 3. Redistributive Impact of Transfers at State 
Level
(estimates of the gini income elasticity of federal transfers)
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Source: Authors’ estimate 
 
 
Given the many dimensions of poverty and the limited space available to analyze them, 
the discussion in this Note remains at a fairly high level of generality in several areas (as noted 
in comments on a draft of this Note by the Development Planning Committee for the State of 
Guerrero (Comite de Planeacion Para el Desarrollo del Estado de Guerrero). The Note also does not 
discuss some of the policies implemented at the state level, not only because state and local 
resources remain small in comparison with federal transfers and programs targeted to the poor, 
but also because many of the household survey data sources used for the empirical work are 
unfortunately not representative at the state level. Finally, the Note does not discuss the issue of 
the vulnerability of households to natural shocks (for example, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, 
and impacts of El Nino) and, more generally, the relationships between poverty and the 
environment. While such issues and relationships are important in the south (as noted by 
government counterparts in Oaxaca), we did not have adequate survey data at our disposal to 
analyze them. In general, given its limitations, the material in this Note should be read in 
conjunction with the more detailed work provided in the various sectoral Notes. Still, while the 
material presented in this Note does not lead to specific recommendations at the state level, it is 
hoped that it does at least provide an idea of the magnitude of the task ahead for poverty 
reduction in the southern states and some broad suggestions or directions for public action. 
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II.  How Poor is the South? A Review of Various Measures of Deprivation 
 
Deprivation is a multidimensional condition that is not well captured by monetary measures of 
poverty alone. Therefore, beyond estimates of the share of the population in poverty according 
to income and consumption data, this section also reviews nonmonetary measures of 
deprivation, namely CONAPO’s Marginality Index and the UNDP’s HDI  
 
 
Income and Consumption Poverty: Comparing the South with the Country as a Whole 
 
Table 2 presents estimates of the share of the population in poverty in the three southern states 
and at the national level, together with a basic poverty profile according to the characteristics of 
the household head. The estimates are given for the three southern states jointly rather than for 
each state individually because the data from the 2000 National Household Survey (Encuesta 
Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares—ENIGH) used for the estimation are not 
representative at the state level. Estimates are provided using aggregates for both per capita 
income and per capita current consumption in the household. Details on the methodology are 
given in Annex 1. 
The first four columns give the shares of the population in the samples as a whole or in 
the respective household groups that are in poverty, using both income- and consumption-
based definitions of poverty. The same poverty lines are used for the two poverty measures, so 
that the difference comes only from the fact that household measures of per capita income or 
per capita consumption are compared with the poverty lines. We find that approximately two 
thirds of the population in the southern states may not be able to pay for the cost of their basic 
food and nonfood needs, versus 42 to 45 percent of the population at the national level. These 
estimates of poverty are probably on the high side, essentially because the bundle used to 
estimate the cost of basic food needs (following a method proposed by the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography, and Information [Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografia e Informática—
INEGI] and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [Comisión 
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe—CEPAL] in the early 1990s; see Annex 1) tends to be 
generous. However, there is some evidence that surveys such as the ENIGH may not 
adequately capture the poorest of the poor (for example, indicators of unmet basic needs such 
as access to basic infrastructure services tend to be higher with Census data than with the 
ENIGH). In any case, for the purpose of this Note, the estimates are sufficient to show the 
higher level of poverty in the south, and it could be shown that with lower poverty lines, 
differences in poverty between the south and the country as a whole would be even more 
striking. Note also that the higher poverty in the south is not limited to specific household 
groups since headcounts of poverty are systematically higher there than in the country as a 
whole. In household groups defined according to the education of the household head, for 
example, poverty in the south is up to 20 percentage points higher than in the country as a 
whole. Similar results are obtained when classifying households according to other 
characteristics. 
 
The next four columns in table 2 give the contributions of the various household groups 
to the overall levels of poverty (the contributions always sum to 100 percent). The information 
presented suggests that, apart from higher poverty rates by category in the south, the overall 
high rates of poverty in the three southern states also result from lower endowments for the 
population living there. These lower endowments are such that in the case of education, for 
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example, individuals living in households in which the household head has no education or an 
incomplete primary education account for 72 percent of the poor in the southern states, versus 
57 to 58 percent nationally. Endowments in terms of job quality also differ. For example, in the 
southern states the self-employed account for more than half of the poor, versus only a third 
nationally. Regression results are presented later in this Note to measure whether the higher 
level of poverty (or more precisely the lower level of per capita income) in the three southern 
states results primarily from lower levels of endowments or assets or from lower returns to such 
assets.  
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Table 2. Share of the Population in Poverty and Poverty Profile by Characteristics of the Household Head, 2000 ENIGH 
  Share of the Poor in the Group Share of the Poor by Group 
 Current Consumption  Income Current Consumption  Income 
  National Southern States National  Southern States National Southern States National Southern States 
Share of population in poverty 45 68 42 67 — — — — 
Profile by education         
No education - primary incomplete 67 80 64 78 57 72 58 72 
Primary complete 47 65 43 65 26 18 26 18 
Lower secondary complete 33 50 30 56 14 6 13 7 
Upper secondary complete 16 23 12 21 3 3 2 2 
University complete 4 12 2 10 1 1 0 1 
Profile by literacy         
Literate 41 63 38 62 80 69 80 70 
Illiterate 77 82 73 80 20 31 20 30 
Profile by employment         
Laborer (nonagricultural) 36 43 31 44 43 18 41 18 
Rural laborer 86 92 86 90 18 24 19 23 
Employer (under 5 employees) 30 40 26 38 4 3 4 3 
Employer (5 or more employees) 5 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Self-employed 59 78 57 79 35 55 36 56 
Profile by formal/informal sector         
Formal 41 59 37 59 64 44 63 44 
Informal 59 78 57 78 36 56 37 56 
Profile by sector of activity         
Agriculture 80 88 79 87 39 66 41 65 
Extraction 16 37 18 37 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 36 61 32 63 20 17 19 18 
Utilities 61 64 55 66 15 6 15 6 
Construction 15 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 
Commerce 31 29 29 40 7 1 7 1 
Transportation 36 43 30 32 4 3 4 2 
Financial services 8 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Services  30 30 26 34 15 7 14 8 
— Not applicable 
Source: Authors’ estimates using 2000 ENIGH, with poverty lines and consumption/income aggregates based on INEGI/CEPAL method (see Annex 1 for details). 
State-Level Indices of Marginality and Human Development 
 
A Marginality Index at the municipal and state level is computed by CONAPO in Mexico. 
Based on Census data (the housing and population Censuses of 1990 and 2000 and the 
municipalities Census of 1995), the index is used to classify municipalities according to various 
levels of marginality. The underlying indicators used to estimate the overall index are:  
· Access to basic infrastructure services and housing. Four indicators are used, namely 
the shares of the population living in dwellings without sanitation, without electricity, 
without piped water, and without sanitation. The index also takes into account the share 
of households living in dwellings with a dirt floor and the share of the population living 
in localities with less than 5,000 inhabitants. 
· Education and wage indicators. Three indicators are used: the rate of illiteracy among 
the population 15 years old or older, the share of the population 15 years old or older 
without completed primary education, and the share of workers with earnings below 
two minimum wages (the level of the minimum wage in Mexico is very low in 
comparison with mean wages, hence the threshold of two minimum wages is used as a 
proxy for poverty).  
Table 3 provides estimates of the underlying indicators at the national level and in the three 
southern states, together with the value of the Marginality Index and the states’ ranking. 
Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca have in that order the highest marginality indices among all 
states.  
Table 3. State-Level Marginality Index and its Components, 2000 Census 
 Dwellings 
without 
Latrines, % 
 
Dwellings 
without 
Electricity, % 
Dwellings 
without Piped 
Water, % 
Dwellings 
without 
Sanitation, % 
Dwellings with 
Dirt Floor, % 
Localities 
with < 5,000 
Inhabitants, 
% 
National 10 5 11 46 15 31 
Chiapas 19 12 25 65 41 61 
Guerrero 35 11 30 60 40 53 
Oaxaca 18 13 27 59 42 64 
 Illiteracy 
among 15+ 
Year Olds, % 
No Primary 
Education 
among 15+ 
Year Olds, % 
Workers below 
Two 
Minimum 
Wages, % 
Overall Index 
of Marginality 
Level of 
Marginality 
State 
Ranking 
National 9 28 51 — — — 
Chiapas 23 50 76 2.25 Very high 1 
Guerrero 22 42 66 2.12 Very high 2 
Oaxaca 21 46 72 2.08 Very high 3 
— Not applicable 
Source: CONAPO. 
 
 
Another useful measure is UNDP’s HDI. The HDI is a weighted sum of three indices 
based themselves on underlying indicators related to life expectancy, educational attainment, 
and per capita income (Box 1). As shown in Table 4, life expectancy is two to three years lower 
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in the three southern states than at the national level. The rate of literacy among the population 
over 15 years of age is 12 to 13 percentage points lower than the national average (this variable 
is one minus the illiteracy rate used in CONAPO’s Marginality Index). The share of the 
population between 6 and 24 years of age enrolled in school also is lower in Chiapas than 
nationally, but apparently this is not the case in the two other states.  Finally, the level of per 
capita GDP also is lower, at approximately half the national average. Overall, the three southern 
states have the lowest ranking among all states for their HDI. 
 
Table 4. State-Level Human Development Index and Its Components, 2000 Census 
 
Life 
Expectancy at 
Birth 
Index of Life 
Expectancy 
Literacy 
among 15+ 
Year Olds 
Index of 
literacy 
Share of 6- to 
24-Year-Olds 
Enrolled in 
School 
Index of 
Combined 
Gross 
Enrollment 
National 75.3 0.839 90.5 0.905 62.8 0.628 
Chiapas 72.4 0.790 77.1 0.771 57.0 0.570 
Guerrero 73.3 0.804 78.4 0.784 63.3 0.633 
Oaxaca 72.5 0.792 78.5 0.785 63.3 0.633 
 
Overall 
Education 
Index 
GDP per 
Capita (US$) GDP Index HDI Level of HDI 
State 
Ranking 
National 0.813 7,495 0.721 0.791 Medium high  
Chiapas 0.704 3,302 0.584 0.693 Medium high 32 
Guerrero 0.734 4,112 0.620 0.719 Medium high 30 
Oaxaca 0.734 3,489 0.593 0.706 Medium high 31 
HDI, Human Development Index. 
Source: CONAPO. 
 
 
Box 1. Methodology for Estimating the Human Development Index 
 
The HDI is a weighted sum of three indices based themselves on underlying indicators. The three 
underlying indicators deal with life expectancy, educational attainment, and per capita income. Because 
per capita income or GDP is included in the HDI, the HDI is a mixed indicator rather than a purely 
nonmonetary measure of well-being. Denoting by X the value of any one of the three underlying 
indicators, the corresponding index is computed using a formula taking into account the actual value of 
the indicator and fixed minimum and maximum values, namely Index = (Actual X -  Minimum 
X)/(Maximum X -  Minimum X). The formula is such that for each country, the value of the indices is 
between zero and one. The higher the value of the index, the better the performance of the country. The 
underlying  indicators and corresponding indices are:  
 
· Life expectancy. The maximum and minimum values are set at 85 and 25 years, respectively. 
· Educational attainment. The index is a weighted average of two components. The first component is 
the adult literacy rate index for which the minimum and maximum values are 0 and 100 percent. The 
second component is the combined gross enrollment ratio index for primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education, with minimum and maximum values also fixed at 0 and 100 percent. In the HDI 
calculation, the adult literacy index and the combined gross enrollment ratio index are given equal 
weight, so that the educational attainment index is the arithmetic mean of its two components.  
· Per capita GDP. The index is based on the logarithm of real per capita GDP measured using 
purchasing power parity values in U.S. dollars, with the minimum and maximum values set at 
log(100) and log(40,000). According to UNDP’s report (2002), income enters into the HDI as a proxy 
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for a decent standard of living, that is, a proxy for “the dimensions of human development not 
reflected in a long and healthy life and in knowledge.”  
 
The HDI is obtained as the straight arithmetic mean of the above three indices. Real GDP, life expectancy, 
and educational attainment are thus given equal weights. See UNDP (2002) for details. 
 
 
III.  How Much Progress Was Achieved in the 1990s? 
 
The level of poverty and other indicators in a country is what matters in real life, but it is the 
trend rather than the level that must be used for evaluating progress. This is recognized in the 
definition of the Millennium Development Goals MDGs agreed upon at the international level 
(these goals are discussed in some detail later in this Note). The first MDG is the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger. But if achieving such an outcome, or more realistically, if reducing 
the absolute number of the poor is the goal, the measurement of progress toward that goal is the 
poverty trend, that is, the change in the rate of poverty over time. 
 
This is true for other indicators as well, and it explains why the MDGs are not set in 
terms of some given poverty or other thresholds to be achieved by 2015, but in terms of a 
percentage reduction in poverty and other indicators from their baseline 1990 values. In the case 
of poverty, it often happens that different analysts find different poverty levels because they use 
different methodologies for measuring poverty. This is not a problem as long as they agree on 
the broad trend. A poverty level is normatively defined, and therefore subjective. For practical 
purposes, a poverty trend is neither normative nor subjective: it is a fact that can be agreed 
upon. In this section, in reviewing the progress achieved in the 1990s, we focus on trends in 
poverty and other indicators, rather than on the level of these indicators. We start with poverty 
and then review other indicators. While our poverty measures may be on the high side, our 
trends should be similar to those obtained by other analysts estimating poverty measures in 
Mexico.  
  
 
Progress for Income and Consumption Poverty 
 
Since poverty measures depend only on the mean level of per capita income in a country or 
region, and the inequality in the distribution of per capita income, the story of the trend in 
poverty in the 1990s in Mexico and in the southern states can be related to changes in mean per 
capita income (economic growth) on the one hand and changes in inequality on the other hand.  
Thanks to solid growth in the second half of the 1990s, Mexico has been able to offset the 
negative impact of the 1994–95 crisis on standards of living; this is observed in the southern 
states as well as in the country as a whole. Table 5 provides estimates of mean per capita income 
levels divided by the poverty line and the extreme poverty line, so that the estimates can be 
considered as representing measures of purchasing power in real terms. All estimates are based 
on the 2000 ENIGH survey. At the national level, the mean per capita income was equal to 3.1 
times the extreme poverty line in 1992. This ratio dropped to 2.6 in 1996 after the crisis, but it 
rebounded to 3.9 in 2000. Over the decade as a whole, there was thus a 27.5 percent increase in 
real income per capita (3.94/3.09 = 1.275). The increase was in fact larger in the southern states, 
  
 
12
12
at 44 percent. Most of the gain, however, was achieved in urban areas (and through rural-urban 
migration). In rural areas, the gains in real per capita income have been much smaller. 
Table 5. Mean per Capita Income Divided by the Poverty or Extreme Poverty Line, 1992–2000 
 National Urban Rural 
 Mexico South Difference Mexico South Difference Mexico South Difference 
 Mean per Capita Income Divided by the Extreme Poverty Line 
1992 3.1 1.5 - 1.6 3.5 1.5 - 2.0 1.6 1.7 0.1 
1996 2.6 1.4 - 1.1 3.1 1.7 - 1.4 1.2 1.5 0.3 
2000 3.9 2.1 - 1.8 4.7 2.5 - 2.2 1.7 2.0 0.3 
 Mean per Capita Income Divided by the Moderate Poverty Line 
1992 1.6 0.8 - 0.8 1.8 0.8 - 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.1 
1996 1.3 0.8 - 0.6 1.5 0.8 - 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.2 
2000 2.0 1.1 - 0.9 2.3 1.2 - 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.2 
 Mean per Capita Consumption Divided by the Extreme Poverty Line 
1992 2.8 1.3 - 1.5 3.1 1.4 - 1.8 1.5 1.5 0.0 
1996 2.4 1.4 - 1.0 2.8 1.6 - 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.3 
2000 3.5 1.9 - 1.6 4.1 2.2 - 1.9 1.5 1.8 0.3 
 Mean per Capita Consumption Divided by the Moderate Poverty Line 
1992 1.4 0.7 - 0.7 1.6 0.7 - 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.0 
1996 1.2 0.7 - 0.5 1.4 0.8 - 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.2 
2000 1.8 1.0 - 0.8 2.1 1.1 - 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.2 
Source: Authors’ estimates using 1992, 1996, and 2000 ENIGH surveys. See Annex 1 for details. 
 
 
To measure inequality, we use the Gini index, which typically takes a value between 
zero and one. A value of one means that one individual or household has all the income or 
consumption (extreme inequality). A value of zero means that all households have the same 
level of per capita income or consumption (perfect equality). With Gini indices varying between 
0.47 and 0.56 at the national and state level, the levels of inequality observed are high by 
international standards, but not especially high by Latin American standards. The levels are 
similar in the south and in the country as a whole. For example, there is slightly more inequality 
in per capita income in the south, but inequality in per capita consumption is higher in the 
country as a whole.  
 
As shown in Table 6, the main difference between the south and the country as a whole 
relates to changes in inequality over time. While there has not been an increase in Mexico as a 
whole (at least when using per capita income as indicator of well-being; with per capita 
consumption, there is a small increase), inequality did apparently increase in the south by 3 to 4 
percentage points, a substantial amount since inequality measures tend to be sticky. This may 
have both short- and long-term implications. In the short run, a higher inequality means higher 
levels of poverty for many given the level of mean per capita income or consumption. In the 
long run, it can be shown that the elasticity of poverty reduction to growth (how much decrease 
in poverty is obtained for each percentage point in growth) is lower when initial inequality is 
higher. The rationale for this can be understood intuitively if one realizes that if an individual 
had all the income (extreme inequality), growth would not lead to poverty reduction since all 
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the gains from growth would be captured by that rich individual. While designing policies to 
tackle inequality is difficult (more so than designing policies for reducing poverty), the 
apparent increase in inequality in the south should be kept in mind in any strategy for poverty 
reduction. 
 
Table 6. Gini Index of Inequality (multiplied by 100), 1992–2000 
 National Urban Rural 
 Mexico South Difference Mexico South Difference Mexico South Difference 
 Gini Index of Inequality in per Capita Income 
1992 53 52 - 2 50 50 0 44 54 10 
1996 52 54 2 49 53 4 45 57 11 
2000 53 56 3 50 54 5 47 56 9 
 Gini Index of Inequality in per Capita Consumption 
1992 50 47 - 3 47 46 - 1 42 49 7 
1996 48 51 3 45 49 4 42 54 12 
2000 51 50 - 1 48 47 - 2 43 50 7 
Source: Authors’ estimates using 1992, 1996, and 2000 ENIGH surveys. See Annex 1 for details. 
 
 
Despite the increase in inequality in the south, growth in the 1990s led to a substantial 
reduction in poverty. As shown in Table 7, from 1992 to 1996, the share of the population in 
extreme poverty (defined as having a level of adjusted per capita income below what is needed 
to meet basic food needs) increased from 54 percent to 60 percent in the south (and from 23 
percent to 31 percent at the national level). But by 2000, extreme poverty levels had fallen well 
below those of 1992, to 46 percent in the south and 17 percent in the country as a whole. One 
might have observed a stronger decline in the south if inequality had not increased over the 
same period. In rural areas especially, the combination of lower growth and the increase in 
inequality meant that over the decade as a whole, only limited progress was achieved toward 
poverty reduction.  
Table 7. Share of the Population in Poverty and in Extreme Poverty, 1992–2000 
 National Urban Rural 
 Mexico South Difference Mexico South Difference Mexico South Difference 
 Share of Population in Extreme Poverty According to per Capita Income 
1992 23 54 31 16 37 21 44 72 28 
1996 31 60 29 19 36 17 61 81 20 
2000 17 46 29 8 21 13 46 70 24 
 Share of Population in Poverty According to per Capita Income 
1992 54 82 28 47 77 30 74 88 14 
1996 61 83 22 52 70 18 85 94 9 
2000 42 67 25 32 48 16 72 86 14 
 Share of Population in Extreme Poverty According to per Capita Consumption 
1992 25 56 31 17 43 26 45 69 25 
1996 30 60 30 18 34 16 61 82 22 
2000 18 41 23 8 18 10 46 63 16 
 Share of Population in Poverty According to per Capita Consumption 
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1992 56 84 28 49 79 29 73 89 16 
1996 61 84 23 53 71 18 85 95 10 
2000 46 68 22 36 52 15 73 84 10 
Source: Authors’ estimates using 1992, 1996, and 2000 ENIGH surveys. See Annex 1 for details. 
 
 
Progress for Nonmonetary Indicators of Well-Being 
 
The data for poverty do not enable us to assess progress at the state level within the southern 
states, because the 2000 ENIGH is not representative at the state level for these three states. To 
assess progress at the state level we can, however, rely on CONAPO’s Marginality Index as 
measured through the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Figure 4 graphs on the horizontal axis the state-
level Marginality Indices for 2000. The changes in the indices between 1990 and 2000 are 
represented on the vertical axis. The three southern states are on the far right of the figure, since 
they have levels of marginality. What is more important is the difference observed in terms of 
progress over time. On average, the changes in the Marginality Indices for the 32 states are zero. 
This does not mean that there has been no progress over time in the underlying indicators used 
for the index (there has been substantial progress, as shown below in Table 8). Rather, the 
Marginality Indices should be considered as a relative measure of deprivation versus the 
national average. Now, while Chiapas and Oaxaca have experienced only small changes in the 
index over time, Guerrero has experienced a substantial increase, which suggests a lower 
performance. 
 
Figure 4. State Marginality Index and Change over Time
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5
Marginality index (2000)
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 m
ar
gi
na
lit
y 
in
de
x 
(1
99
0-
20
00
)
Guerrero
Oaxaca
Chiapas
 
  Source: CONAPO. 
 
 
The lower performance of Guerrero is confirmed in Table 8, which provides data on the 
underlying indicators used for estimating the index. The figures in the table represent in 
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percentage points the gains achieved for each of the underlying indicators during the 1990s. For 
example, a value of 7.18 for illiteracy in Chiapas means that the rate of illiteracy among the 
adult population has been reduced by 7.18 percentage points between 1990 and 2000. Overall, 
the gains are substantial, especially in terms of access to basic infrastructure services, but they 
are lower for Guerrero than for the other two southern states in virtually all the indicators. We 
do not have the means to conduct a detailed analysis at the state level in this Note to 
understand what happened in Guerrero, but the lower performance of the state warrants 
further work. 
 
Table 8. Progress in State-Level Components of the Marginality Index, 1990–2000 
 
Illiteracy Primary 
Education 
Latrines Electricity Piped 
Water, % 
Sanitation Dirt Floor Population 
Density 
Adult 
Wages 
Chiapas   7.18         11.77         23.33         22.91         17.10         9.04         10.00         5.35         4.19        
Guerrero  5.30         8.44         15.19         11.59         14.49         9.97         9.86         2.69         1.65        
Oaxaca   6.05         11.17         27.42         11.27         15.26         10.49         10.91         5.61         6.80        
The numbers above reflect percentage point improvements in the indictors over time. 
Source: CONAPO. 
 
 
We do not have data readily available to provide a similar analysis of trends over time 
in the HDI and its components, but it is likely that improvements have been observed there as 
well. For illustrative purposes, Figure 5 provides trends for the period 1995–2000 in the primary 
and secondary school completion rates for Mexico as a whole and for the three southern states, 
using data from the Ministry of Education. The southern states are clearly catching up with the 
national average at the primary level, even if they are still lagging behind at the secondary level. 
 
Figure 5. Primary and Secondary School Completion Rates, 1995–2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Secretariat of Public Education (Secreteria de Educación Publica—SEP) 2002. 
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Overall, then, for both poverty and nonmonetary indicators of well-being, we can say 
that substantial progress was achieved in the southern states during the 1990s. In some areas, 
such as primary schooling and access to basic infrastructure services, the southern states are 
slowly catching up with the rest of the country. In other areas, including levels of income and 
per capita GDP, the southern states still have a lot of room for progress ahead of them. In the 
next section, we go beyond a purely descriptive presentation of the data to analyze the 
determinants of per capita income, and thereby answer the question: Why are the southern 
states so poor? 
 
 
IV.  Why Is the South So Poor? An Analysis of the Determinants of Income Poverty 
 
Difference between a Poverty Profile and an Analysis of the Determinants of Poverty 
 
A profile of the poor in the southern states and a comparison with the national poverty 
estimates was provided in Table 2. While the information in Table 2 is useful, it is better to rely 
on regressions to analyze the determinants of poverty. The problem with poverty profiles is that 
although they give information on who the poor are, they cannot be used to assess the impact of 
various variables on the probability of being poor, controlling for other variables that may affect 
this probability. For example, the fact that households in the south have a higher probability of 
being poor than households in the country as a whole may have little to do with area 
characteristics of the south. The differences in poverty rates between the south and the country 
as a whole may result instead from differences between the characteristics of the households 
living in the south and those of households nationally. To sort out the correlates or 
“determinants” of income and, thereby, poverty and to assess why households are poorer in the 
south, regressions are needed.  
 
This section provides the results of such regressions using the 2000 ENIGH survey. The 
impact on per capita income of the following variables is assessed: (a) the geographic location of 
the household (urban versus rural); (b) household size variables and their square (number of 
infants, children, and adults), whether the household head is a woman, the age of the 
household head and its square, and whether the household head has a spouse; (c) a number of 
characteristics of the household head, including his/her level of education; whether he/she is 
employed, unemployed, searching for work, or not working; his/her sector of activity; his/her 
position; whether he/she works in the public sector; the size of the firm in which he/she works; 
and whether he/she is underemployed; and (d) the same set of characteristics for the spouse of 
the household head, when there is one. Separate regressions are estimated for the country as a 
whole and for the three southern states taken together. We do not estimate the regressions 
separately for each state because of a lack of representativity of the underlying data at the state 
level (as was the case for the poverty profile in Table 2). While we do not report results for the 
determinants of per capita consumption, the conclusions reached when analyzing the 
determinants of income also are valid for the determinants of consumption, because both 
measures of well-being are highly correlated.  
Apart from analyzing the determinants of per capita income and, thereby, poverty, we 
also provide decompositions to explain where the differences in per capita income between the 
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southern states and the country as a whole come from. Households in the south have a level of 
per capita income equal to only half (54 percent) of the national average. Such differences in 
income may come from differences in assets (say, a lower level of education for the household 
head and the spouse in the south), or from differences in the returns to assets (say, a lower 
impact of education on earnings and thereby a lower per capita income in the south). In some 
cases, the differences in assets and in the returns to assets reinforce each other but, in other 
cases, they partially offset each other, and it is often difficult a priori to establish what will be 
the case. 
 
Impact of Demographic and Labor Force Participation Characteristics of the Household 
 
Controlling for other variables in the regressions, households with a larger number of infants 
and children have a lower level of per capita income, and thereby a higher probability of being 
poor. This is indicated by the negative regression coefficients (declining at the margin because 
of the positive term for the coefficients of the quadratic variables) in the first two columns of 
Table 9. The negative impact on per capita income of having many infants and children is not 
surprising since the resources of the household have to be shared among a larger number of 
members.  
 
The next two columns in Table 9 provide the mean values of the variables nationally and 
in the southern states. Families in the southern states tend to have many infants (0.76 infant per 
household on average, versus 0.69 at the national level) and children (1.54 infant per household 
on average, versus 1.25 at the national level). If we were not taking into account differences 
between the southern states and the country as a whole in the impact of each additional infant 
or child on per capita income, the fact that households in the south have more infants and 
children would account for one tenth (9.6 percent) of the total difference in per capita income 
between the south and the national average. However, differences between the south and the 
country as a whole in the “returns” to having more infants or children account for - 7.5 percent 
of the difference in per capita income (a negative contribution suggests a gain for income in the 
south). Thus, the net impact of the larger number of infants and children in the south represents 
only 2.1 percent of the total difference in per capita income. Closer inspection of the results in 
Table 9 suggest that the offsetting impact of the returns results from a lower negative impact of 
having many children in the south. What is probably happening here is that children are more 
likely to contribute to the resources of the household in the south, essentially through child 
labor.  
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Table 9. Impact of the Number of Infants and Children, 2000 ENIGH 
 
Regression Coefficients Assets 
(variable means) 
Share of Difference  
in per Capita Income 
 National South National South Assets Returns 
Number of infants (0–4 years old) - 0.21 - 0.38 0.69 0.76 2.1 18.2 
Number of infants squared NS 0.08 1.27 1.41 - 0.3 - 14.0 
Number of children (5–14 years old) - 0.31 - 0.25 1.25 1.54 13.4 - 13.8 
Number of children squared 0.03 0.03 3.28 4.52 - 5.6 2.2 
Total infants and children      9.6 - 7.5 
NS, not statistically significant. 
Note: Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level. Other coefficients are significant at the 
5 percent level.  
Source: Authors’ estimates using ENIGH 2000. 
 
 
Table 10 provides a similar analysis for the adults in the households. There are a number 
of offsetting impacts here, but the bottom line is relatively easy to see. Differences in the 
demographic characteristics for the adults and in their labor force participation account for a 
relatively minor share (6.3 percent) of the difference in per capita income between the south and 
the country as a whole. There is a small gain in the south because of such characteristics (- 3.5 
percent), and a loss from differences in returns (9.8 percent). Other interesting results from 
Table 10 include the fact that, nationally, having more adults in the household is associated with 
a lower per capita income, but in the south the impact is not statistically significant, possibly 
because poverty requires a larger share of adults to be working in the south (this is apparent in 
the table for both the head and the spouse who have a lower probability of not working in the 
south, but it may also apply to other household members above 15 years of age whose work 
patterns are not explicitly modeled in the regressions). The results also suggest that households 
with younger heads are more likely to be poor, which is not surprising since they have had less 
time to accumulate assets. Households whose head has no spouse are also likely to be poorer, at 
least at the national level (the impact in the south is not statistically significant).  
 
Regarding employment, not working is associated with a drop in income. This is also 
the case for underemployment, but to a lower extent, and only in the south, possibly because 
households have fewer other sources of income to rely on when the spouse is not working full 
time. The negative impact of underemployment for the spouse in the south may have 
implications for policy, as other countries have been able to implement job training and 
employment programs targeted to women. Still, more work would be needed in this area to 
reach a better understanding of the issues and their relationship to the characteristics of the 
labor market in the south. This issue is examined further in the Labor Markets Note. 
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Table 10. Impact of Adult Demographic Characteristics and Work Patterns, 2000 ENIGH  
 
Regression Coefficients Endowments (variable 
means) 
Share of Difference  
in per Capita Income 
 National South National South Assets Returns 
Demographics       
Number of adults (15 years or older) - 0.17 NS 3.26 3.23 - 0.7 - 125.1 
Number of adults squared 0.02 NS 13.05 12.75 0.7 68.8 
Age of the head of household (head) 0.04 0.04 45.87 47.74 - 11.7 14.0 
Age of the head squared 0.00 0.00 2305 2505 10.3 1.0 
Female head - 0.14 NS 0.15 0.14 - 0.2 1.6 
No spouse 0.17 NS 0.18 0.17 0.2 9.9 
Employment and underemployment       
Head not working NS NS 0.14 0.10 - 0.3 - 1.3 
Spouse not working - 0.18 - 0.52 0.53 0.46 - 1.9 23.0 
Head working less than 13 hours 0.13 NS 0.19 0.16 0.4 4.0 
Head working 13–19 hours NS NS 0.02 0.03 - 0.1 - 0.1 
Head working 20–39 hours NS NS 0.14 0.17 - 0.1 0.8 
Spouse working less than 13 hours NS - 0.21 0.57 0.53 - 0.4 10.0 
Spouse working 13–19 hours NS NS 0.02 0.04 0.1 0.2 
Spouse working 20–39 hours NS - 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.0 2.9 
Total adult characteristics     - 3.5 9.8 
NS, not statistically significant. 
Notes: The coefficients are significant at a 5 percent level. Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10 
percent level.  
Source: Authors’ estimates using ENIGH 2000.  
 
 
While the above results regarding the impact of demographics on per capita income and 
thereby poverty make sense, they are to some extent sensitive to methodological choices made 
for income measurement. By using per capita income as our indicator of well-being, we do not 
allow for economies of scale in the household, or for differences in needs between household 
members. By ruling out economies of scale, we consider that the needs of a family of eight are 
exactly twice the needs of a family of four. With economies of scale, a family of eight having 
twice the income of a family of four would be judged better off than the family of four. Thus, 
not allowing for economies of scale overestimates the negative impact of the number of infants 
and children on poverty. Moreover, by ruling out differences in needs between household 
members, we do not consider the fact that larger households with many children may not have 
the same needs as smaller households because the needs of babies and children tend to be lower 
than those of adults. Not considering differences in needs thereby also leads to an 
overestimation of the impact of the number of infants and children on poverty. Even if 
corrections were made to take into account both differences in needs and economies of scale 
within the household, a larger number of infants and children would still lead to a lower level 
of per capita income and thereby a higher probability of being poor, so that a reduction in 
fertility would still reduce poverty.  
 
For the analysis of the sources of the differences in per capita income between the south 
and the country as a whole, this methodological clarification implies that we may be 
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overestimating the role of demographics. Since the total contribution of demographics and labor 
force participation (in terms of differences of both characteristics and returns) is itself relatively 
small, we can probably safely say that enabling the south to catch up with the level of per capita 
income enjoyed in the rest of the country will not depend primarily on policies dealing with 
fertility.  
 
 
Impact of the Education of the Head of Household and the Spouse 
 
The education of the head of household and the spouse has a large impact on per capita income 
(Table 11). Nationally, a household with a head having completed university has an expected 
level of income higher by 78 percent higher than an otherwise similar household whose head 
has no education at all. Having a head of household with secondary education brings in a gain 
in per capita income of 40 percent versus no schooling. Completing primary schooling brings in 
a gain of 16 percent. The gains from a well-educated spouse are of a similar order of magnitude. 
Given the structure of the returns to education, the fact that heads of households and spouses 
have a lower level of education in the south than in the country as a whole accounts for more 
than a fifth (21.6 percent) of the total differential in per capita income. Additionally, the returns 
to education tend to be smaller in the south, perhaps because employment opportunities are not 
as attractive, so that household heads and spouses with some education do not fully reap the 
benefits of their education.   
 
When the differences in returns to education are taken into account, education accounts 
for one third (31.6 percent) of the differential in per capita income between the south and the 
country as a whole. This has clear implications for education sector policy as a key component 
of any poverty-reduction strategy (this issue is discussed in the Education Note and, to some 
extent, in the discussion of targeted programs such as PROGRESA provided later in this Note). 
 
Table 11. Impact of Education of the Head of Household and Spouse, 2000 ENIGH 
 
Regression Coefficients Endowments (variable 
means) 
Share of Difference  
in per Capita Income 
 National South National South Assets Returns 
Head of household (head) some 
primary education NS NS 0.24 0.33 - 0.1 3.1 
Head primary completed 0.16 NS 0.22 0.17 1.2 1.9 
Head some lower secondary 0.19 0.33 0.03 0.02 0.4 - 0.3 
Head lower secondary completed 0.24 NS  0.16 0.07 3.2 1.0 
Head some upper secondary 0.40 NS 0.02 0.01 0.8 0.4 
Head upper secondary completed 0.41 0.40 0.05 0.05 0.0 0.1 
Head some university 0.56 NS 0.03 0.02 1.0 1.0 
Head university completed 0.78 0.51 0.08 0.03 4.7 1.4 
Spouse some primary education 0.10 NS 0.21 0.26 - 0.7 0.1 
Spouse primary completed 0.22 NS 0.19 0.14 1.6 2.4 
Spouse some lower secondary 0.23 NS 0.03 0.01 0.4 0.0 
Spouse lower secondary completed 0.33 0.39 0.16 0.05 5.4 - 0.5 
Spouse some upper secondary 0.44 NS 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.1 
Spouse upper secondary completed 0.47 0.56 0.05 0.03 1.1 - 0.4 
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Spouse some university 0.57 0.75 0.02 0.01 0.7 - 0.3 
Spouse university completed 0.83 0.83 0.04 0.03 1.5 0.0 
Total education     21.6 10.0 
NS, not statistically significant. 
Note: The coefficients are significant at a 5 percent level. Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10 
percent level.  
Source: Authors’ estimates using ENIGH 2000. 
 
 
Impact of the Quality of Employment of the Head of Household and the Spouse 
 
The quality of employment of the head of household and the spouse is an even more important 
contribution than education to the difference in per capita income between the south and the 
country as a whole. Overall, differences in employment characteristics account for 43.1 percent 
of the income gap between the south and the country as a whole. Slightly more than half (23.8 
percent) results from differences in characteristics and the other half from differences in returns.  
 
The largest negative factor affecting the south is the fact that many heads and spouses 
work in firms with fewer than five workers, and that the income penalty from working in such 
firms (as opposed to larger firms) is larger in the south. When taking both characteristics and 
returns into account, the impact of working in small firms accounts for 26.6 percent of the 
difference in per capita income between the south and the country as a whole. This result does 
not mean that the creation of small firms in the south should be discouraged. It remains better 
to work, even in a small firm, than to not work at all. And there may be ways to improve the 
productivity of small firms through well-designed credit and other programs and through 
better access to markets thanks to better infrastructure (see the Infrastructure Notes). At the 
same time, however, one must be realistic in acknowledging that small firms cannot provide 
benefits similar to those available in larger firms, and that encouraging relocation of large firms 
to the south is not likely to be a viable option. In this respect, temporary and permanent 
migration from the south to other areas, or from rural areas to cities within the south, represents 
an appropriate strategy for households to diversify their income sources, access better jobs, and 
improve their standards of living (see the NAFTA Note on why the North American Free Trade 
Agreement [NAFTA] did not reach the south and the Labor Markets Note for a discussion). 
 
Table 12. Impact of Employment Characteristics of the Head of Household and Spouse, 2000 ENIGH 
 
Regression Coefficients Endowments (variable 
means) 
Share of Difference  
in per Capita Income 
 National South National South Assets Returns 
Job characteristics of head of 
household (head)       
Head worker (nonagricultural) - 0.08 - -0.19 0.46 0.25 - 2.6 4.0 
Employer (fewer than 5 employees) 0.34 0.40 0.06 0.04 0.9 - 0.3 
Employer (5 or more employees) 0.94 1.06 0.01 0.01 0.0 - 0.1 
Self-employed NS NS 0.23 0.42 0.5 2.9 
Head in firm with fewer than 5 workers - 0.30 - 0.37 0.38 0.55 7.8 5.5 
Firm with 5 to 9 workers - 0.22 - 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.2 1.7 
Firm with 10 to 19 workers - 0.12 NS 0.07 0.05 - 0.3 - 1.3 
Access to social security (household) 0.07 NS 0.28 0.12 1.6 1.5 
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Job characteristics of spouse       
Spouse worker (nonagricultural) NS NS 0.13 0.06 0.0 1.5 
Employer (fewer than 5 employees) 0.33 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.3 - 0.3 
Self-employed NS NS 0.10 0.22 0.2 - 0.4 
Spouse in firm with fewer than 5 
workers - 0.21 - 0.43 0.18 0.30 3.8 9.5 
Firm with 5 to 9 workers NS NS 0.04 0.03 0.0 0.3 
Firm with 10 to 19 workers NS NS 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.4 
Head sector of activity       
Extraction 0.59 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.3 - 0.1 
Manufacturing 0.30 0.32 0.21 0.17 2.0 - 0.6 
Utilities 0.25 0.36 0.10 0.06 1.4 - 0.9 
Construction 0.15 NS 0.01 0.00 0.1 - 0.1 
Commerce 0.34 0.49 0.08 0.02 3.3 - 0.4 
Transportation 0.33 0.60 0.05 0.04 0.5 - 1.5 
Financial services 0.81 1.19 0.01 0.00 1.4 0.0 
Services 0.26 0.50 0.19 0.15 1.7 - 5.1 
Spouse sector of activity       
Manufacturing NS NS 0.10 0.18 - 0.3 1.3 
Utilities NS NS 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Commerce 0.20 NS 0.05 0.02 0.9 0.2 
Transportation 0.29        NS 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.1 
Financial Services NS NS 0.00 0.00 0.1 0.0 
Services NS NS 0.10 0.06 0.0 1.5 
Total employment characteristics      23.8 19.3 
NS, not statistically significant. 
Note: The coefficients are significant at a 5 percent level. Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10 
percent level.  
Source: Authors’ estimates using ENIGH 2000. 
 
 
Apart from the impact of the size of the firm, the second largest contributor to the 
difference in expected income between the south and the country as a whole is the sector of 
activity in which the head and the spouse are working. The bottom part of Table 12 gives the 
expected impact of working in various sectors, as compared with working in agriculture (the 
excluded category not represented in Table 12). The fact that all the regression coefficient 
estimates in the table are positive implies that households with heads working in the 
agricultural sector tend to have lower levels of per capita income than other households. This is 
true nationally as well as in the south. For example, a household with a head employed in 
manufacturing has an expected level of per capita income 30 percent higher than an otherwise 
similar household with a head working in agriculture. The impact of the spouse’s sector of 
activity tends to be smaller than that of the head of household (many coefficients are not 
statistically significant). Nationally, only 19 percent of the population lives in a household 
whose head is working in agriculture, versus 45 percent in the south. In the south, virtually no 
households have a head or spouse working in the financial services sector, which is the sector 
with the highest return. Overall, the fact that the population in the south is more dependent on 
sectors of activities that are less favorable accounts for 11.5 percent of the income differential 
between the south and the country as a whole. However, the gains associated with not working 
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in agriculture are slightly higher in the south, so that the impact of differences in returns offsets 
part of the negative impact of the sectoral composition of employment (5.6 percent). The net 
impact of the sector of activity is then only 5.8 percent. 
 
 
Impact of Geographic Location 
 
As shown in Table 13, differences in urbanization and area characteristics account for 17.2 
percent of the differences in income between the southern states and the country as a whole. 
Controlling for other variables, households living in urban areas have a higher level of per 
capita income than households living in rural areas. The premium for urban households is 39 
percent nationally and 46 percent in the south. When both the proportion of the population 
living in urban areas and the returns to living there are taken into account, the lower rate of 
urbanization in the south accounts for 9.8 percent of the difference in per capita income between 
the south and the country as a whole. Moreover, the impact of unobserved differences between 
households in the south and the overall population is captured by the difference in the overall 
constants of the regression. These unobserved effects, which are likely to be related to area 
characteristics rather than to household characteristics (since we have controlled in the 
regressions for a large number of household characteristics), account for 7.2 percent of the gap 
in income between the south and the country as a whole. It can be expected that urbanization 
will progressively increase in the south, thereby reducing the contribution of this factor to the 
lower levels of income in the south, but this is likely to take a long time (the gap in the rate of 
urbanization is large, at 27 percent). 
 
Table 13. Localization and Unobserved (probably area) Characteristics, 2000 ENIGH 
 
Regression Coefficients Endowments (variable 
means) 
Share of Difference  
in per Capita Income 
 National South National South Assets Returns 
Urban location (vs. rural) 0.39 0.46 0.75 0.48 15.0 - 5.2 
Constant  6.06 6.02 — — 0.0 7.2 
Total location     15.0 2.0 
— Not applicable 
Note: The coefficients are significant at a 5 percent level. Underlined coefficients are significant at the 10 
percent level.  
Source: Authors’ estimates using ENIGH 2000.  
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Conclusion on the Determinants of per Capita Income 
 
As mentioned earlier, households in the south have a level of per capita income equal to only 
half (54 percent) of that enjoyed in the country as a whole. The analysis conducted above 
suggests two main reasons for this. First, two thirds of the differences in per capita income 
result from differences in characteristics rather than from differences in the returns to these 
characteristics. This implies that a poverty-reduction strategy for the south must rely primarily 
on interventions designed to improve the characteristics of the households living there. Second, 
in terms of categories of effects explaining the differences in income between the south and the 
country as a whole, the quality of employment comes first (accounting for 43.1 percent of the 
gap), followed by education (31.6 percent of the gap). Urbanization and unobserved effects 
likely to result from differences in area characteristics between the south and the country as a 
whole come third, at 17.0 percent. The contribution of demographic and labor force 
participation characteristics is lower, at only 8.4 percent. While this analysis is fairly simple, it 
does suggest where gains can be obtained to improve standards of living in the south. 
 
 
IV.  Do the Poor in the South Benefit from Federal Transfers and Programs? 
From the previous section, we know that interventions designed to improve the education level 
of the poor and their employment opportunities are key to offset the gap in standards of living 
between the south and the rest of the country. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a substantial 
increase in real terms in federal funding for the social sectors, including targeted poverty 
programs. Special focus has been placed on investing in human capital of the poor. In this last 
section, after briefly documenting the increase in public social spending at the federal level, we 
assess whether poorer states (and thereby the southern states) benefit more or less than other 
states from federal transfers and programs. Next, using household data, we assess whether 
selected federal programs do reach the poor within the southern states. Finally, we discuss 
briefly some of the features of PROGRESA, the newest and largest program for the poor.  
 
 
Increase in Social Sector Spending in the 1990s 
Federal, state, and local governments have a fundamental role to play in reducing poverty and 
improving social indicators. At the federal level, stable and sound macroeconomic and labor 
policies are one of the most important contributions that governments can make for the 
reduction of poverty (see the Macroeconomic and Labor Markets Notes). A second important 
contribution comes from the impact of federal public spending for the social sectors. 
According to CEPAL (2001), social public spending per capita increased on average by 
50 percent between 1990–91 and 1998–99 in Latin America. The scope of the increase differed 
between countries, but the increase was generalized. In Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, 
and the Dominican Republic, spending more than doubled. In countries with higher initial 
levels of spending (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Panama), the increase was smaller, 
around 30 percent over the decade. In Mexico, the increase was 55 percent, from US$259 per 
capita in the beginning of the decade to US$402 at the end of the decade. In Mexico, as in other 
countries, the increase in spending was made feasible thanks to economic growth (a higher level 
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of per capita GNP leads to higher spending per capita, holding the share of spending in GNP 
constant), a higher level of fiscal pressure, and a reorientation of fiscal priorities toward the 
social sectors. 
While this increase in spending was good news for the poor, in comparison to other 
countries, the level of public social spending in Mexico still remains relatively low. Table 14 
proposes a typology of the countries in terms of their fiscal pressure and their fiscal priorities. 
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have high levels of social spending as a share 
of GNP because they combine high fiscal pressure with an emphasis on the social sectors for 
expenditures. By contrast, countries such as El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Peru 
have low levels of social spending as a share of GNP because they combine low fiscal pressure 
with low levels of priority for the social sectors. Despite some prioritization for the social sector, 
the level of social spending as a share of GNP in Mexico remains low because of low fiscal 
pressure.  
One priority, therefore, could be to increase the resources available to the government 
(at the federal level) to pursue a more aggressive social policy. A range of options would be 
available. One existing proposal consists of raising the value-added tax (VAT) (by terminating 
some exemptions) and using a substantial portion of the proceeds for social and poverty 
programs. While raising the VAT would in itself hurt the poor (since the VAT is less 
progressive than other taxes), combining an increase with strong compensatory measures for 
the poor could be in their favor overall. We do not want to argue for specific policy 
recommendations in the area of taxation in this Note, but it is important to highlight the fact 
that Mexico’s level of spending for the social sectors remains low given its level of economic 
development (see the Macroeconomics and Federalism Notes). Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, and Panama all spend a larger share of their GNP on the social sectors than Mexico, 
as do Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. 
Table 14. Typology of Latin American Countries in Terms of Social Spending, 1998 
Fiscal Priority: Share of Total Public Spending Going to Social Sectors Fiscal Pressure: Expenditures 
as Share of GNP Less than 40% Between 40% and 60% More than 60% 
More than 30% Nicaragua (12.7) 
Colombia (15.0) 
Panama (19.4) 
 
Costa Rica (16.8) Argentina (20.5) 
Brazil (21.0) 
Uruguay (22.8) 
Between 20% and 30% Honduras (7.4) 
Venezuela, R.B. de (8.6) 
 
Bolivia (16.1) Chile (16.0) 
Less than 20% El Salvador (4.3) 
Dominican Republic (6.6) 
Peru (6.8) 
Guatemala (6.2) 
Mexico (9.1) 
Paraguay (7.4) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses correspond to the share of social spending in GNP. 
Source: CEPAL 2001.  
 
 
State-Level Targeting Performance of Selected Federal Transfers and Programs 
 
The extent to which the southern states benefit from public social spending in Mexico depends 
on the type of spending considered. Some large categories of expenditures in education and 
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health are distributed according to past investments and the demand from households, which 
tends to be higher in non-southern states and among the nonpoor. For example, as discussed in 
the Education Note, while spending for primary education is propoor, spending at the upper 
secondary and tertiary levels tends to be pro-rich. At the same time, several categories of 
spending are targeted to poor areas and households, and therefore to the south. 
 
One simple way to summarize the distribution of federal spending between states is to 
provide estimates of the GIE of the various transfers and programs (see Wodon and Yitzhaki 
[2002] for a description of the GIE). A GIE of one means that program benefits or transfers are 
distributed between states in the same way as per capita GDP, so that an increase in benefits or 
transfers would not affect the inequality between states in per capita GDP. A GIE larger than 
zero means that per capita GDP and program benefits are positively correlated, hence the states 
in the upper (lower) part of the distribution of income benefit more from the increase in 
spending. A GIE of zero means that all states benefit in the same way on a per capita basis from 
an increase in federal spending for the program, hence the increase in spending is progressive 
since it is distributed more equally than per capita GDP. A GIE between zero and one means 
that the distribution of the increase in spending for the program is positively correlated with 
per capita GDP, so that the states that are better off receive a higher share of the benefits on a 
per capita basis, but the increase in spending is progressive because it is not as unequally 
distributed as per capita GDP. Overall, when comparing programs or categories of transfers, the 
program or transfer that is most redistributive is the program with the lowest GIE.  
While factors other than the GIE should be taken into account when deciding which 
programs or transfers to cut or expand, the GIE does provide a good basis for ranking the 
redistributive impact of alternative policies. Also, while the descriptive tool of the GIE can be 
used to analyze the distribution of transfers between states, it also can be applied to an analysis 
of the distributional characteristics of programs and transfers at the household level (this is 
done later in this section). When household data are available, it is better to use household-level 
estimates of the GIE. Hence, in this section we focus on transfers for which we do not have 
household-level estimates of the GIE, with the exception of PROGRESA, in order to provide 
some perspective.   
 
Table 15 provides the state-level estimates of the GIE of selected federal transfers. With 
the exception of Credito a la Palabra, a program run by the Secretariat of Social Development 
(Secreteria de Desarrollo Social—SEDESOL) that provides credit to farmers, all the programs have 
a GIE below minus one, which is highly redistributive. This means that on a per capita basis, 
poorer states benefit much more than richer states from the targeted poverty programs, which is 
logical since many among the poor tend to live in poorer states. Some of the programs have a 
built-in targeting formula, as is the case with the social funds for new social infrastructure (the 
Federal Transfer Fund for Social Infrastructure [Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura 
Social—FAIS], Fund for Municipal Social Infrastructure [Fondo para la Infraestructura Social 
Municipal—FISM], and the Fund for State Social Infrastructure [Fondo para la Infraestructura 
Social Estatal—FISE]) that are targeted to poor states and to poor municipalities within states, 
according to a propoor formula known as the Municipal Deficit Level (Masa Carencial Municipal- 
MCM). The Universal Health Care Program (Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura—PAC), which 
provides a basic package of health services to those without access to health posts and centers, 
is the most redistributive program at the state level, followed by PROGRESA, an integrated 
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program with education, health, and nutrition components (more details on the targeting 
performance of PROGRESA and its impact on the poor are provided below). The Mexican 
Institute of Social Security’s (Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad—IMSS) Solidaridad, the National 
Council for Educational Development’s (Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo—CONAFE) 
compensatory programs for education, and the Temporary Employment Program (Programa de 
Empleo Temporal—PET) also are highly redistributive at the state level  
 
Table 15 also provides estimates of the GIEs for education and health spending. While 
the education GIEs are based on actual outlays from the federal government to the states, the 
health GIEs are based on the share of households using the various types of services. The results 
are as expected. Spending for lower levels of education is more redistributive than spending for 
higher levels. More precisely, in the case of spending per capita for preprimary and primary 
schooling, the GIEs below zero mean that if the value of the public education were taken into 
account in the GDP per capita measures of the states, the poorer states would receive a higher 
transfer in absolute terms than the richer states. This is the case probably because the fact that 
some households in richer states use private schools more than compensates for the fact that 
some households in the poorer states are not enrolled. The GIE for secondary education is close 
to zero, suggesting an equal per capita allocation for all states on average. The GIEs for the 
preparatory and tertiary levels are below one, so that even these expenditures are inequality 
decreasing at the margin, but they also are above zero, suggesting that richer states get a larger 
allocation per capita than poorer states, especially at the tertiary level. For health, we find that 
services provided by the Ministry of Health are more redistributive (that is, inequality reducing 
at the margin) than services provided by the IMSS and the Institute of Social Security and Social 
Services for State Employees (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del 
Estado- ISSTE),which is again as expected, since these two institutions provide services to the 
middle income class in urban areas 
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Table 15. State-Level Estimates of the Gini Income Elasticity of Federal Transfers, 2001 
 State-level GIE 
Federal poverty programs  
Social funds (FAIS, FISM, FISE) - 1.36 
Temporary Employment Program (PET) - 1.22 
Credito a la Palabra - 0.53 
PROGRESA - 1.68 
Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura (Universal Health Care Program) - 1.80 
IMSS Solidaridad - 1.41 
Compensatory education programs - 1.02 
Federal transfers for education  
Preprimary - 0.41 
Primary  - 0.38 
Secondary 0.04 
Upper secondary 0.11 
University 0.68 
Federal transfers for health  
All medical 0.49 
SSA 0.04 
IMSS 1.41 
ISSTE 0.51 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
 
Household-Level Targeting Performance of Selected Federal Transfers and Programs 
 
There are a few programs for which we have data on household-level participation and benefits 
in the 1997 Survey of Household Socioeconomic Characteristics (Encuesta de Características 
Socioeconómicas de los Hogares—ENCASEH. This survey can be used for the analysis of the 
targeting performance of (a) the Program for Direct Assistance in Agriculture (Programa de 
Apayos Directos al Campo—PROCAMPO), a transitional program giving cash transfers to farmers 
to compensate them for losses in income following NAFTA (while this program is not targeted 
to the poor, it has a large impact on the poor because many farmers are poor); (b) the Tortilla 
Subsidy Program (Fideicomiso para la Liquidacion al Subsidio de la Tortilla—FIDELIST), which 
gives one kilogram of tortillas per family per day to households with low wages; (c) the 
subsidized milk program LICONSA, which gives a 25 percent reduction in the price of milk for 
families with low wages and children; (d) Children’s Solidarity (Ninos de Solidaridad), which is a 
targeted program of stipends for school children; (e) School Breakfast Program (Desayunos 
Escolares), which consists of school breakfasts given in schools, under management of the 
Integral Development of the Family Agency (Desarrollo Integral de la Familia—DIF); (f) other DIF-
funded programs providing support for the poor; and finally (g) PROGRESA, which is 
discussed in more detail below. For most programs, the survey can be considered as nationally 
representative. However, for PROGRESA, the data come from a separate component of the 
survey implemented only in a subset of states, including Guerrero, but not Chiapas and Oaxaca. 
The data are for 1997, and are already a bit old, but since the distribution of the benefits of the 
programs has not changed too much since then, the data are likely to provide a good idea of 
today’s benefit incidence profile.  
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Table 16 first provides estimates of participation rates by quintile. This is done for the 
sample as a whole and in the southern states. Coverage levels are relatively low for most 
programs, even in the bottom income quintile. The exceptions are PROCAMPO, the Desayunos 
Escolares, and especially PROGRESA in the south, with participation rates of about 40 percent 
in the poorest quintile for the first two programs, and 75 percent for PROGRESA. In terms of 
the shares of participants in the various income quintiles, we find that the two programs with 
the lowest performance are the food subsidies for tortillas and milk. The two programs with the 
best targeting performance are PROGRESA and the Desayunos Escolares. Finally, the table 
provides the shares of outlays that accrue to the various quintiles for the two programs for 
which we have information on the amounts of transfers received in the survey, namely 
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA (for the other programs, we only know about participation). 
PROGRESA’s share of transfers by quintiles is similar to the share of beneficiaries by quintile. 
This suggests a distribution of benefits closely following the distribution of participants. By 
contrast, the share of transfers received from PROCAMPO is much less propoor than the share 
of program participants, essentially because the transfers received are proportional to the 
amount of land cultivated, with richer farmers controlling larger parcels of land than poorer 
farmers.  
 
Table 16. Benefit Incidence for Various Social Programs by Quintile, 1997 ENCASEH 
 National Southern States 
 All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Participation rate             
PROCAMPO 6.0 14.1 6.3 4.2 4.1 1.3 16.8 42.9 22.8 9.7 6.4 1.9 
FIDELIST 6.8 6.5 9.2 8.2 7.1 2.9 7.3 2.6 12.1 11.0 6.3 4.5 
LICONSA 8.5 8.1 9.9 10.0 8.6 5.8 2.0 0.6 3.5 3.7 1.8 0.6 
Ninos de Solidaridad 2.4 4.2 4.3 2.3 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.9 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Desayunos Escolares 6.0 12.1 7.3 5.1 3.3 1.8 14.7 41.0 18.3 7.6 5.4 0.9 
DIF 2.7 5.3 3.5 2.2 1.4 0.7 4.9 10.8 7.6 2.6 2.7 0.6 
PROGRESA 6.2 15.7 10.1 3.4 1.1 0.5 30.9 74.6 39.0 25.2 12.0 3.2 
Percentage of beneficiaries             
PROCAMPO  47.5 21.4 13.7 13.2 4.2  51.3 27.2 11.6 7.7 2.2 
FIDELIST  19.4 27.8 24.1 20.1 8.6  7.2 33.4 30.1 17.2 12.1 
LICONSA  19.4 24.0 23.6 19.5 13.6  6.3 34.3 36.3 17.5 5.5 
Ninos de Solidaridad  34.7 36.1 18.7 5.9 4.5  42.0 43.4 14.5 0.0 0.0 
Desayunos Escolares  41.3 24.9 17.1 10.6 6.1  56.0 25.1 10.3 7.3 1.3 
DIF  40.9 27.3 16.4 10.1 5.3  44.6 31.4 10.5 11.1 2.4 
PROGRESA  51.0 32.7 11.1 3.6 1.6  49.4 29.8 12.1 6.7 1.9 
Percentage of amounts             
PROCAMPO  16.4 15.7 13.2 25.4 29.3  25.6 21.5 23.0 11.2 18.7 
PROGRESA  46.2 35.2 12.6 4.2 1.8  46.5 28.9 14.1 8.4 1.8 
Source: Authors’ estimates using 1997 ENCASEH.  
 
Using the concept of the GIE introduced above, Table 17 confirms that PROGRESA and 
(somewhat surprisingly) the DIF programs have the best targeting performance, with food 
subsidies lagging far behind. The fact that PROGRESA is well targeted is encouraging since it is 
by far the largest poverty program in Mexico. In the case of PROGRESA, a sophisticated three-
stage targeting mechanism is used (Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman 1999). First, using Census 
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data, poor rural localities are selected on the basis of their level of marginality. Other elements 
for selection into the program include geographic location, the distance between localities, and 
the presence of health and education infrastructures. The second stage in the targeting process 
consists of selecting eligible families within participating communities. For this, PROGRESA 
collects data on all households living in participating communities and a discriminant analysis 
is used to classify households as poor (beneficiaries) or nonpoor (nonbeneficiaries). The third 
stage in the targeting process consists of checking the selection of beneficiaries within the 
community. Local authorities have the opportunity to review the targeting proposed by 
PROGRESA and to suggest a second visit by PROGRESA staff if they believe that some poor 
families should be reclassified as nonpoor or vice versa (the proportion of households whose 
selection is disputed is in practice very small — only 0.1 percent of the selected households).  
 
Table 17. Gini Income Elasticities by Programs Nationally and in the Southern States, 1997 
 
Household-Level GIE 
National 
Household-Level GIE 
Southern States 
PROCAMPO (not targeted, but reaching the poor) 0.28 - 0.13 
FIDELIST (free tortillas) - 0.13 0.06 
LICONSA (subsidized milk) - 0.10 - 0.05 
Ninos de Solidaridad (stipends for schooling) - 0.72 NA 
Desayunos Escolares (school breakfasts) - 0.69 - 0.94 
DIF (other support programs) - 0.71 - 0.83 
PROGRESA (cash component of the program) - 0.93 - 0.81 
NA, Not available. Source: Authors’ estimates using 1997 ENCASEH, based in part on Wodon and others 
(2002). We do not provide an estimate for Ninos de Solidaridad in the three southern states because of 
low sample size. 
 
However, while the targeting of PROGRESA is sound overall, there is evidence that 
targeting the program by distinguishing poor from nonpoor households within very poor 
communities (many of which are located in the south) may not be efficient. The issue is not so 
much the administrative cost of the process, but rather the fact that separating poor from 
nonpoor households in small villages is not easy and may create social tensions. Since the gains 
from within-community targeting have been shown to be relatively small, it may be better in 
some cases to let all the households in selected communities benefit from the program. Such a 
choice has been recommended by the International Food Policy Research Institute in Honduras, 
where it is advising on the redesign of the Family Allowance Program (Programa de Asignación 
Familiar—PRAF, a program similar to PROGRESA. The main problem with the idea of not 
targeting the program in small and highly marginalized localities is that two households living 
in different localities but with otherwise similar characteristics might be treated differently, 
which raises issues of fairness. 
 
To sum up, in this section, we have found that substantial resources are targeted to the 
southern states and to poor households living in these states. The southern states tend to benefit 
more than other states (with respect to their population) from a number of categories of social 
and targeted spending. This does not necessarily imply that public spending in Mexico favors 
poorer states and poorer households in these states, because large categories of public spending 
have not been reviewed in this Note. Still, the findings do suggest an effort at the federal level 
to attack the root causes of poverty in the south, especially in recent years through the 
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implementation of programs such as PROGRESA or FISM. Beyond the analysis of the incidence 
of such transfers, the issue of the potential long-term beneficial impact of programs has not been 
discussed here, but it is analyzed in some details in the Millennium Development Goals Note 
and the efficiency of the southern states in reaching these goals. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
As stated, the objective of this Note is to answer a number of basic questions. First, how poor 
are households living in Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca, and to what extent have they benefited 
from the limited progress observed toward poverty reduction in the 1990s in Mexico as a 
whole? Second, are households in the south poor because of a lack of assets or because they 
enjoy only limited returns to their assets? Third, to what extent do federal transfers benefit 
households in the south, and especially poor households within the south?  
 
The main results and conclusions that emerge from the analysis are not surprising. 
Households living in the southern states are much poorer than households living in the rest of 
Mexico, whether poverty is defined in terms of household income or consumption, or in terms 
of marginality and human development indices. Furthermore, limited progress was observed in 
the 1990s toward the reduction of income or consumption poverty, although gains were 
achieved toward improving human development indicators and improving the access of 
households to basic services. As to why households in the south are so poor, the analysis 
suggests that a lack of assets rather than differences in the returns to assets is to blame. The 
main gaps in assets are related to a lower quality of employment in the south, a lower level of 
education and, to some extent, a lower quality of geographic location. Differences in 
demographic characteristics and labor force participation, by contrast, play a smaller role.   
 
On the positive side, an analysis of the incidence of federal social spending suggests that 
poorer states benefit more than other states from spending for social funds and targeted 
programs for the poor. At the household level, the analysis suggests that while food subsidies 
apparently suffer from substantial leakages to the nonpoor, demand-side education and human 
development programs such as PROGRESA appear to be well targeted. These newer programs 
also tend to generate long-term gains for participants through their impact on the children’s 
human capital. 
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Annex 1. Methodology for the Measurement of Poverty 
  
Three elements are needed to compute a poverty measure: (a) an indicator of well-being such as 
consumption or income, (b) a poverty line to which the indicator can be compared, and (c) a 
statistical tool (the poverty measure) used for reporting the results of the comparison of the 
indicator with the poverty line. The most widely used poverty measures are the well-known, 
additively decomposable FGT indices (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984). The incidence of 
poverty, denoted by P0 or H for the headcount index, is simply the share of the population 
living with income or consumption below the poverty line. The depth of poverty, measured by 
P1 or PG for the poverty gap, captures the distance separating the poor from the poverty line as 
a proportion of that line (the nonpoor having a zero distance). The severity of poverty, 
measured by P2 or SPG for the squared poverty gap, takes into account not only the distance 
separating the poor from the poverty line, but also the inequality among the poor. Higher order 
poverty measures are rarely used and are more difficult to interpret. In this Note, because of 
limited space, we focus the analysis of the levels and trends in poverty on the headcount index.  
The estimation of the poverty lines used for identifying the poor was done following the 
methodology provided in a study by INEGI/CEPAL (1993) titled Magnitud y Evolución de la 
Pobreza en México: 1984-1992, Informe Metodológico. The study relies on the cost of basic needs 
method to measure poverty. It first computes the cost of a food basket to estimate the cost of 
basic food needs, and then scales up this cost to take into account nonfood needs. The food 
basket representing basic food needs is anchored in a normative nutritional requirement of 
2,165 kcal per person and per day, following the guidelines of the 1981 Consultative Meeting of 
Experts held by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World 
Health Organization (Organización Mundial de Salud- OMS), and the United Nations 
(Organización de Naciones Unidas- ONU). The choice of the food items reflects Mexican food 
consumption patterns, with different baskets used for the urban and rural sectors. The extreme 
rural and urban poverty lines corresponding to the cost of basic food needs were computed 
using survey-based prices or, more precisely, unit values. The unit values are those paid on 
average by the households with per capita income between the 20th and 50th percentiles of the 
income distribution, so that they are representative of the prices paid by the poor (the mean unit 
values differ in urban and rural areas). The surveys identify income received by each family 
member according to 25 categories, which can be aggregated into (a) wages and salary income; 
(b) current monetary income, which includes wages and salaries, income from self-
employment, property income and rents, monetary transfers, and income from financial assets; 
and (c) total current income, which includes all of the above, plus nonmonetized income such as 
imputed rent, in-kind transfers, and stock dividends. For ranking households in the distribution 
of income, we used total current income.  
Having computed the extreme poverty lines for the various years (relying on 
INEGI/CEPAL’s estimates for 1992), we obtained the moderate poverty lines by assuming (as 
does INEGI/CEPAL) that the cost of basic food needs represents 50 percent of the cost of total 
basic needs in urban areas and 57 percent in rural areas. In other words, to obtain the moderate 
poverty lines, the extreme poverty lines are scaled up by a fixed factor (2.0 in urban areas and 
1.75 in rural areas). The resulting sets of poverty lines are available upon request. 
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